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Abstract
There appear to be two seemingly contradictory images of economic change
in the Islamic World and mixed evidence on whether Islamic societies have been
open or conservative against modern ideas, technological advancements, and legal
developments. Whereas a conservative attitude has been dominant in some soci-
eties and time periods, Muslims were at the forefront of scientific, technological,
and legal developments in others. Rather than rely on ad hoc assumptions about
the attitudes and characteristics of societies or the inherent qualities of new de-
velopments, this paper explains attitudes towards change by studying the political
economy of the relationship between the rulers and the legal community. I extend
recent theories of endogenous institutional change to develop a framework based
on how rulers and legal community reacted to new developments immediately and
how their strategic interaction unleashed an endogenous process toward change in
the long run. Using this framework, I identify conditions under which new ideas,
technologies, and legal developments have resulted in immediate change in Is-
lamic societies. I also examine the process of change in the long run, whether and
how immediate outcomes could be sustained over time as strategic interaction
continued repeatedly.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C7, D02, D7, H1, H3, K4,
N4, O0
Presented at the Conference: ”Law and Economic Development: a Historical
Perspective”, Utrecht, Utrecht University, Sept. 20-22, 2007




 Islamic societies have been characterized as being historically conservative 
against modern ideas, technological advancements, and legal developments.  Various 
types of evidence have been identified as supporting this view.  Modern developments in 
physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences, for example, were not introduced into the 
curriculum into the Ottoman Engineering School until the nineteenth century.  Similarly, 
the printing press was not officially accepted until the eighteenth century, almost three 
centuries after the invention of the moveable type was known in the Islamic World.  It 
also took a long time for some of the fundamental organizational developments, such as 
the concept of a corporation, to be recognized by the legal system.1  As a result, the 
Islamic World missed out or enjoyed only with significant delay the benefits of various 
scientific, technological, and legal developments that other parts of the World realized in 
the form of long term economic growth and higher standards of living. 
 The problem with the view of Islamic societies as being guarded against 
economic change is that it is difficult to generalize it for all times, places, and types of 
new developments.  The story of economic change in the Islamic World has a brighter 
side.  While some schools did not teach modern natural sciences, others did.  Earlier in 
history, such as during the ninth and tenth centuries, Muslims were at the forefront of 
                                                 
1 For details and other examples, see Güçek (1987), Huff (2003), İhsanoğlu (2004), Kuran (2005), and 
Robinson (1993). 
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scholarly, scientific and technological developments.   Similarly, the law was vibrant, 
changing as necessary to facilitate production and exchange throughout the fast growing 
Islamic World.  Examples of openness and innovativeness can be found not just in distant 
history but more recently in modern societies, as can be seen in the quick adoption of 
new technologies, the founding of modern public and private educational institutions, and 
the development of areas of fast economic growth.2   
 There appear to be two seemingly contradictory images of economic change in 
the Islamic World, creating a fundamental difficulty in the literature in developing a 
satisfactory framework to understand the problem in its entirety.  Writers have often 
focused on either stagnation or change as being more representative and needing an 
explanation, rarely looking to explain why both images were observed.  Those 
considering stagnation as the more representative and problematic image have typically 
attributed it to a fixed characteristic of Islamic societies, such as traditionalism or 
religious conservatism.3  Others considering change as the more representative image, on 
the other hand, have similarly focused on characteristics like pragmatism and flexibility 
for explanation, painting a rosier picture of the past as well as the potential for the 
future.4  Although there have been writers trying to resolve the contradiction between the 
two images, their attempt has typically been in the form of identifying an intrinsic 
quality, such as usefulness or religious compatibility, of a new scientific, technological, 
or legal development, to be able to differentiate between those that were accepted and 
others that were rejected and to make sense of how observed images varied across time 
                                                 
2 For examples of openness to change, see Clarence-Smith (2006), Hassan and Hill (1986), Huff (2003), 
Iqbal (2002), and İhsanoğlu (2004). 
3 See, for example, Jones (1987: Chapter 9), Landes (1969: 28-30), Lewis (1982). 
4 For example, Hassan and Hill (1986), Iqbal (2002), İhsanoğlu (2004), and Pamuk (2004). 
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and space.  By typically relying on ad hoc assumptions about how the attitudes and 
characteristics of societies or the inherent qualities of new developments have changed 
over time and across societies, these attempts have also failed to account for the variation 
in economic change.  
What is needed is a framework that can account for the observed complexity as a 
whole, one that is simple yet flexible enough to explain stagnation and change in Islamic 
history comprehensively.  For a simplified approach to the problem, this article will study 
it in the context of the relationship between the rulers and the legal community.  The 
legal community has been an influential group in Islamic societies because of their power 
in the interpretation and adjudication of the law.  The rulers have often called upon the 
legal community to issue opinions on the “legality” of new developments, jointly shaping 
the society’s decision on how to respond to new scientific, technological, and legal 
developments.  To study the strategic interaction between the rulers and the legal 
community, I will adopt a political economy approach to Islamic history and use insights 
from recent studies of institutional change (Greif, 2006; Coşgel, Ahmed, and Miceli, 
2007; Kuran, 2004).  Such an approach will allow an explanation of change or stagnation 
not as the outcome of a fixed characteristic of Islamic societies or an intrinsic quality of a 
new development, but in terms of how it would affect the ruler’s relationship with the 
legal community. 
More specifically, I have three objectives.  The first is to extend Greif’s (2006) recent 
theory of endogenous institutional change to develop an explanation of economic change 
based on how rulers and legal community reacted to new developments immediately and 
how their strategic interaction unleashed an endogenous process toward change in the 
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long run.  The second objective is to identify conditions under which new ideas, 
technologies, and legal developments have resulted in immediate change in Islamic 
societies.  When a new development and its impact was recognized and the cost of 
change was low, the rulers and the legal community could react immediately in such a 
way to accept it jointly.  Depending on how each development affected the interests of 
the ruler and the legal community, some new developments could result in immediate 
institutional refinements, while others could be ignored.  The proposed explanation of 
economic change helps to identify different types of reasons for refusal or acceptance.  
The third objective is to examine the process of change in the long run, whether and how 
immediate outcomes could be sustained over time as strategic interaction continued 
repeatedly.  The reactions of the rulers or the legal community and the cooperation 
between them could be altered over time as a result of external developments and 
endogenous processes.  While some developments could be rejected at first, they could 
eventually be accepted if there was an endogenous process undermining the initial 
choice.  The cooperation between the ruler and the legal community could also be subject 
to change.  Although cooperation generally could remain a viable and reinforced 
institution, there could also be processes undermining the relationship and causing 
episodes of confrontation that required refinements or even reforms to reset the 
parameters of the cooperation to be able to deal with these developments.  
 
STAGNATION AND CHANGE IN ISLAMIC HISTORY 
 The evidence appears mixed on whether the typical response to the introduction 
of new developments in science, technology, and law has been refusal or acceptance.  In 
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some instances, accepting change took a long time or never happened.  Some of the 
refusals to adopt new developments have attracted significant attention.  It is well-known, 
for example, that despite a high demand for books, a clear awareness of the new printing 
technology, and a successful reproduction of it within Ottoman lands by religious 
minorities, Ottoman rulers and legal community did not officially sanction printing in 
Arabic characters until the eighteenth century and did so only for non-religious books.5  
There were similar delays in the adoption of other new technologies like the mechanical 
clocks and various modern scientific developments in medicine, astronomy, geography, 
and other natural sciences (Huff, 2003).  Human dissection was forbidden in the teaching 
of medicine, some of the great centers of astronomic research at observatories were 
closed, and modern educational institutions for the study of natural sciences were not 
established until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 Change did not come fast in adopting some of the new legal developments and 
forms of business organization either.  As Kuran (2004: 71) has recently argued, “in 
certain areas central to economic modernization change was minimal…In eighteenth-
century Cairo, credit practices hardly differed from those of the tenth century.  Likewise, 
investors and traders were using enterprise forms essentially identical to those prevalent 
eight centuries earlier.”  As late as the nineteenth century, some of the significant 
components of the institutional endowment of the Islamic World inhibiting the private 
accumulation of capital had not been removed.  The laws of inheritance had not changed, 
                                                 
5 For different perspectives on the adoption of printing press in the Islamic World, see Eisenstein (1979), 
Güçek (1987), Robinson (1993), and Savage-Smith (2003). 
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the concept of corporation as a distinct legal entity had not been recognized, and rigidities 
in the private provision of public goods through the waqf system had not been removed.6
 The image of a conservative attitude towards new scientific, technological, and 
legal developments in early modern period, however, seems to contradict with openness 
shown in other areas during the same period.  Military technology, for example, remained 
a vital and fast changing backbone of Islamic states during this period, so much that it has 
earned them the title “gunpowder empires” (Hodgson, 1974).  There were also Taqi al 
Din’s well-known advances in astronomy in Istanbul observatory and various educational 
institutions established by the Ottomans for scientific education in applied medicine, 
astronomy, and mathematics (İhsanoğlu, 2004).  Noting the importance of changes made 
to the madrasa system in the fifteenth century, İhsanoğlu (2004: 16) has argued that with 
these changes “the Islamic world experienced an unprecedented wave of scientific 
progress.”  
The image of a conservative attitude does not seem applicable to other times, 
places, and sectors of Islamic history either.  This image appears to contrast sharply, for 
example, with the evidence available on these activities in earlier periods.  Though slow 
to adopt the printing press in the fifteenth century, Muslims were previously very quick 
to adopt the paper, a Chinese invention of comparable magnitude to the printing press in 
the history of communications technology.  They similarly appropriated the bulk of 
Greek science and philosophy during the eighth and ninth centuries.  Noting these 
accomplishments, Huff (2003: 325) has argued: “Arab-Islamic culture and civilization 
                                                 
6 Gibb and Bowen (1957: volume 1, part II: chapters X and XII), Huff (2003: chapters 4 and 6), Kuran 
(2004), and Schacht (1970). 
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had the most advanced science to be found in the world prior to the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries.  In optics, astronomy, the mathematical disciplines of geometry and 
trigonometry, and medicine, its accomplishments outshone those of the West as well as 
China.7   
There is also evidence that suggests that Islamic societies were quick to revise the 
legal system and make institutional changes as necessary.  This is particularly evident in 
the Ottoman public sector, for example in their tax codes and bureaucratic organizations.   
An urgent task of the Ottomans following the conquest of new land was to draft the tax 
code, which they immediately performed based on preconquest rules and policies but 
sometimes also with significant changes as necessary (Coşgel, 2004, 2005).  Numerous 
innovations similarly took place in methods of tax collection, the government switching 
from the use of cavalrymen or salaried officials to private citizens or even lifelong agency 
relationships in the collection of taxes (Coşgel and Miceli, 2006).  The structure of 
Ottoman bureaucracy and provincial administration, including systems of appointment 
and remuneration, also changed as necessary (Findlay, 1980).  Reviewing institutional 
change in the Ottoman Empire, Pamuk (2004) has argued that, contrary to the image of 
the Empire depicted as rigid and unchanging, it was in fact flexible and pragmatic, 
willing and able to adapt to changing circumstances as necessary.   
 The image of a general conservative attitude also contrasts sharply with some of 
the developments that have taken place in the Islamic World more recently.  Muslim 
societies have been very quick to adopt advancements in digital, optical, or transportation 
technologies in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries.  They have similarly 
                                                 
7 See also Clarence-Smith (2006), Goldstone, (1987: 130), Hassan and Hill (1986), Hogendijh and Sabro 
(2003), Iqbal (2002), and Mokyr (1990: 34-35). 
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been at the forefront of introducing some of the novel economic institutions and 
organizational innovations such as the OPEC in the Middle East and microfinancing in 
Bangladesh, each with significant impacts on economic development and living standards 
around the World.  There are several examples of creativity among the elements of the 
recent movement called Islamic Economics.  The systems of borrowing and lending 
called Islamic banking based on different interpretations of interest, for example, can now 
be found in not just the Islamic World but also among the portfolio of services offered by 
some of the World’s largest financial organizations.  A similar innovation is the extension 
of zakat obligation from its traditional base of individuals to a system that now includes 
the earnings of firms, bank deposits, and other assets.8  In part due to oil revenues, 
several Gulf states have achieved some of the highest rates of growth, and they have 
overseen some of the largest urban development projects taking place in the World (e.g., 
Dubai) in recent history.  One could easily interpret these developments as evidence of 
innovativeness and fast change in the Islamic World.   
Evidence thus appears mixed on whether conservatism or openness better 
describes the reactions against economic change in the Islamic World.  Whereas some 
sectors and time periods have seen resistance to change, other episodes have seen change 
welcomed or adopted with some delay.  Some changes were introduced quietly, more as 
institutional refinements than wholesale reforms; others were confrontational and had to 
be introduced by force or decree, such as the Tanzimat reforms of the Ottoman Empire in 
the nineteenth century or the Republican Revolution of the early twentieth century.  
Given the mix of evidence available on change and stagnation, a satisfactory explanation 
must account for the mixture as a whole, not just the failure to accept some of the 
                                                 
8 For a critical evaluation of these developments and Islamic economics in general, see Kuran (1995). 
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scientific, technological, and legal changes, but also the enthusiasm to accept some 
immediately and the concession to delay others. 
 
STUDIES OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
 A dominant tendency in the literature on economic change in Islamic history has 
been to focus on one side of the story and offer one sided explanations.  Studies of 
economic change in the modern period, for example, have typically emphasized 
stagnation in ideas, technologies, and legal systems as the ordinary state of affairs during 
this period.  Historians have singularly focused on such things as the omission of certain 
disciplines in scientific education, late adoption of printing or industrial technology, or 
the inability to implement new forms of business organization.  Explanations of these 
phenomena have also been mostly one-sided, typically noting a fixed characteristic of 
Islamic societies, such as traditionalism or religious conservatism, or an inherent quality 
of new developments, such as their threat to religious beliefs, as being responsible for the 
failure to adopt change.9  
Studies noting change and progress as being more ordinary during this period 
have also been one-sided, naturally going to the other extreme of attempting to show 
examples of areas in which significant developments were achieved.  This is also true for 
studies of economic change during the ninth and tenth centuries, where the focus has 
been on the achievements of Muslim scholarship, science, and technology, without fully 
acknowledging or questioning why these achievements did not continue into the modern 
period.  Explanations of success in change and progress have similarly identified a 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Coulson (1964), Genç (2000), İnalcık (1973: Ch. 18), Jones (1987: Ch. 9), Landes 
(1969: 28-30), Lewis (1982), and Schacht (1964). 
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common quality, such as being “reliable and useful”, of those areas in which Islamic 
societies were open to change.10  
Although there have been studies acknowledging both stagnation and change, 
their focus has also typically been on one of these phenomena, offering explanations that 
work well for one side of the story but not necessarily the other.  For example, 
Goldstone’s (1987) study of the disappearance of Ottoman innovativeness after the 
fifteenth century, Huff’s (2003) explanation of the failure of Islamic science and 
technology to continue in leadership after the fourteenth century, and Kuran’s (2004) 
study of the stagnation of the legal infrastructure of the Islamic Middle East by the 
nineteenth century share focus on stagnation as the more problematic side of the story 
that needs explanation.  It is also typical among this type of studies to identify an intrinsic 
quality of modern science, technology, or legal systems that does not fit well with a fixed 
characteristic of Islamic societies. 
 There have been four general types of problems with previous explanations of 
stagnation and change in Islamic history.  The first is that the methodology of choosing a 
fixed characteristic of Islamic societies and explaining change by determining whether 
there was a match with a given quality of a new item often proceeds by making ad hoc 
assumptions about these characteristics or qualities.  While this procedure explains too 
easily some cases of perfect fit, such as between pragmatism and pragmatic items, it fails 
to explain anomalous cases of misfit, such as the between prohibiting the consumption 
but taxing the production of wine and pork and between religiousity and the refusal to 
print religious texts.  The general strategy of attributing stagnation or change to social, 
religious, or moral attitudes is particularly problematic because they are not directly 
                                                 
10 For example, İhsanoglu (2004), Hassan and Hill (1986), and Clarence-Smith (2006). 
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observable and invite ad hoc explanations.  A related problem is that the mechanisms 
behind social attitudes or characteristics are not specified.  Even though a certain 
characteristic like traditionalism might provide an accurate description of a society at a 
certain point in time, identifying this description goes only so far.  It only explains how 
economic change or stagnation may have happened, but not why.  It does not explain, for 
example, what were the reasons behind this characteristic, whose preferences, motives, 
and interests were involved, and what was the mechanism that transformed these into 
social outcomes.  We need to know the microfoundations for the social characteristics or 
attitudes observed in the aggregate.  The third problem is to view change as a single 
event, rather than a possibly long process.  When a refusal to adopt a new development 
instantaneously is viewed simply as a failure to accept change, then various endogenous 
processes that the new development may have generated may be ignored, processes that 
might eventually cause change.  Such an approach fails to explain why sometimes change 
takes longer than others.  A fourth type of problem with previous studies is their 
difficulty in explaining shifts over time or differences across societies and sectors.  
Various reversals of trend have been observed in history, such as the initial rejection of 
the printing press and its eventual acceptance, or the initial leadership in astronomy and 
eventual stagnation a few centuries later.  These kinds of reversals are usually explained 
by attributing them to a gradual transformation in a society’s characteristics, such as 
westernization or modernization, but without providing a satisfactory explanation for 
why this transformation occurred.  It is not clear, for example, why different 
developments are adopted at different times and whether the underlying process of 
transformation was endogenous.  For a more satisfactory explanation of economic change 
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and stagnation, we need to avoid ad hoc assumptions about the characteristics of societies 
or the intrinsic qualities of new developments, probe deeper into the micro foundations 
for the observed macrobehaviors, view change as a process, and identify the endogenous 
mechanisms underlying this process.11
 
STABILITY AND CHANGE IN INSTITUTIONS 
 The difficulties faced by explanations of economic change in Islamic history are 
analogous to those faced by recent theories of institutional change in general.  Greif 
(2006) has recently grouped these theories into two general categories.  There is, on the 
one hand, the game theoretic approach, in which institutions emerge as endogenously 
generated equilibria.  The challenge this type of an approach faces has been the difficulty 
of explaining endogenous change (Hall and Taylor, 1996; Greif, 2006).  The only way 
change makes sense in this type of framework is if it has origins in parameters exogenous 
to the institution under consideration.  The other general approach to institutional change 
is historical institutionalism, which focuses on process instead of equilibria and studies 
change through positive and negative feedback loops.  Change is the result of a process in 
which negative loops keep undermining the institution and caused the creation of a new 
institution.  Contrary to game theoretic approach that cannot explain change, historical 
institutionalist approach suffers from the opposite problem of overpredicting change and 
explaining it too easily (Greif, 2006).   
Bridging the divide between the game-theoretic and historical institutionalist 
approaches, Greif (2006) has proposed a new theory of endogenous institutional change.  
                                                 
11 For examples of other commentaries of the relevant literature, see Clarence-Smith (2006), Goldstone, 
(1987), Hallaq (1997), Huff (2003: 53-5), Humphreys (1991), İhsanoğlu (2004), and Iqbal (2002). 
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His theory builds on repeated game theory.  Introducing the concepts of “quasi-
parameters” and “self-reinforcement,” he studies why and how institutions change or 
remain stable in a changing environment and the processes that ensure their survival or 
lead to their eventual demise.  Changes in quasi-parameters do not necessarily lead to a 
change in the behavior associated with an institution immediately but may do so in the 
long run by setting off an endogenous process that either reinforces or undermines it.  An 
institution is self-reinforcing when it increases the range of situations in which 
individuals find it in their best interest to adhere to the behavior expected of them.  
Conversely, it is self-undermining if the process reduces this range.  Institutional change 
would take place at the critical point when the range shrinks so much that the associated 
behavior is no longer self-enforcing.  In addition to developing these concepts 
theoretically, Greif (2006) has also applied them empirically to paired comparison of 
institutional change, namely the comparisons of political regimes in Venice and Genoa 
and cleavage structures in Nigeria and Estonia. 
Greif’s approach is useful in studying institutional change in Islamic history.  The 
institution of primary interest here is the shared expectation of mutual cooperation 
between the ruler and the legal community in shaping the society’s reaction towards 
change.  The legal community has been an influential group in Islamic societies because 
of its power over the ordinary people and its relationship with the rulers and other 
influential groups (Coşgel, Ahmed, and Miceli, 2007).  The community has historically 
consisted of individuals trained in the Islamic Law, serving primarily as teachers 
(mudarris) educating the Muslim community, as judges (qādī) resolving legal disputes, 
or as jurisconsults (muftī) offering legal opinions.  Although there have been various 
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other influential groups in Islamic history, such as the janissaries or religious minorities, 
the legal community has been in a unique position in the distribution of power because of 
its dual responsibilities of providing public goods and services, such as the clarification 
of property rights and the issuance of legal opinions, for the ordinary people and also 
acting as the counsellor and regulator for the decisions of the ruler.12  
To see the nature of the cooperation between the rulers and legal communities in 
shaping new developments, consider first the potential for a conflict between their 
interests.  Once a new scientific idea, technological innovation, or legal development was 
introduced, the legal community’s function was to issue an opinion on whether to permit 
or ban it.  The rulers had the choice between giving credibility to these opinions by 
authorizing them in a cooperative relationship with the legal community and ignoring or 
even prohibiting these opinions in a confrontational relationship.   The ruler’s choice was 
thus whether to enter into a cooperative relationship with the legal community, and the 
legal community’s task in this relationship was to choose among available options, 
including even those that may not have been in the best interest of the ruler.  Although it 
could sometimes be in the best interest of the legal community to choose the option 
preferred by the ruler, at other times their own interests could dictate other choices.  Their 
strategic interaction, most likely in repeated settings, would determine the outcome.   
Many of the new developments in ideas, technology, and jurisprudence could affect 
the interests of the ruler, the legal community, or both.  At any point in time the current 
configuration of these elements provided the rulers and the legal community direct 
benefits in the form of tax revenues or remuneration, or indirect benefits from power and 
                                                 
12 For legal communities in different periods of Islamic history, see Coşgel, Ahmed, and Miceli (2007), 
Crone and Hinds (1986), Esposito (1999), Ghazzal (2005), Hallaq (2005), Heyd (1961), Imber (1997), 
Vikør (2005), Zaman (2002), Zilfi (2006), and Zubaida (2003). 
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status.  New developments could affect the self-enforceability of the previous system 
significantly and alter the set of available benefits.  New ideas could change the source 
and distribution of power in the society; new technologies could reduce the ruler’s returns 
from production and tax revenue or the legal community’s remuneration from services or 
private contributions; and new legal developments could constrain the ruler’s coercive 
powers to tax or spend or the legal community’s ability to constrain the ruler or claim a 
share of the public revenues.  Ideas, technologies, and the legal system were thus 
essential institutional elements determining the returns the rulers and the legal 
community could receive from their strategic interaction with each other.  Any 
exogenous or endogenous changes in these elements were likely to change their returns, 
possibly resulting in new outcomes for the society as a whole. 
 The reaction to these changes could be immediate or gradual, depending on 
uncertainty about them and the cost of change.  Numerous outcomes could be observed, 
depending on the source of change, direction of its benefits, knowledge about available 
alternatives, and transition costs.  Consider, for example, the simple hypothetical case of 
a clearly noticed new development that was obviously beneficial to both the ruler and the 
legal community.  In that case, if the cost of change was negligible, one would expect the 
legal community to accept the change immediately and for the new development to be 
implemented without delay or controversy.  Change in this case could be in the form of a 
refinement in one of the institutional elements, with no consequences for the expectation 
of mutual cooperation.   
The situation would be more complicated at the other extreme if the new 
development went unnoticed, its impact was not well understood, change was costly, or 
 17
its benefits were distributed conflictingly between the ruler and the legal community.  
Very little may be known, for example, about the impact of a new external technology, or 
it may be expected to affect one of the parties positively but the other negatively.  In such 
cases, the immediate outcome of the strategic interaction between the rulers and the legal 
community could be to ignore or reject the new development and maintain the status quo 
in the short run.13   
Change could come later as a result of the repeated interactions of the rulers and the 
legal community if the new development unleashed an endogenous process that 
undermined the stability of existing choices.  Two types of change could be observed in 
the long run, depending on whether the final outcome came as a result of institutional 
refinement or wholesale reform.  One possibility would be a delayed acceptance of 
change at a later point in time, as the benefits of a new development were better 
understood and cost of change went down.  If, for example, the new development brought 
positive benefits to both parties but they failed to recognize these benefits immediately, it 
could be an easy matter for them to accept change eventually as benefits were better 
understood.  Even when change was initially denied because one of the parties expected 
to lose from the new development, they could eventually find the new technology more 
attractive as the benefits of exiting situation eroded because of an undermining influence.  
The adjustment in this case could be made by a refinement of one of the institutional 
elements, say a new technology or legal development, keeping the institution of 
cooperation intact.  Institutional trajectory could follow the past. 
                                                 
13 See Greif (2006) for a detailed discussion of how various problems of knowledge, attention, and 
coordination may cause individuals to follow past behavior despite changes in their exogenous 
environment.  As another possibility not examined here, even if both parties may expect to benefit 
positively from change, there may be other parties, such as the military, that need to be convinced or 
coerced into accepting the change at some cost, which may also deter accepting the new developments.   
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Another possibility is when wholesale reforms were necessary to implement change, 
ending the expectation of mutual cooperation.  The new development and increasing 
recognition of its existence or impact could create significant tension between the rulers 
and the legal community, for which minor refinements may not be sufficient.  If, for 
example, the rulers continued to cooperate in the short run despite a loss of revenue 
caused by the legal community’s refusal of a new development, they could at some point 
have to cease cooperation as the loss grew and the legal community was unwilling to 
switch.  The process undermining their cooperation could be strong enough to cause a 
gradual divergence of interests and a need to resolve the conflict by an end to 
cooperation.  
It may be informative to illustrate a simplified version of the argument with a formal 
game-theoretic example.  Consider the following game in sequential form showing a 
simplified interaction between the rulers and the legal community.  In this game, the ruler 
first decides whether to cooperate with the legal community or defect.  If he decides to 
cooperate, then the legal community issues an opinion on whether to maintain an existing 









(b,b)                             (b+π1,b+π2) 
 
Figure 1  
The first number in parentheses shows the ruler’s payoff and the second the legal 
community’s.  The parameters are designed to show the possibility of asymmetric 
benefits from change and the resulting possibility of a one-sided prisoners’ dilemma type 
of a situation.  The parties receive a payoff of 0 from non-cooperation and positive 
benefits (b>0) from cooperating under an old technology.  Additional benefits of the new 
technology can vary, depending on the values of π1 and π2. 
Consider first the case of symmetric benefits (π1=π2).  It is easy to see that if both 
parties receive positive additional benefits from the new technology, the equilibrium is 
(cooperate, new).  But (cooperate, old) is the equilibrium if the new technology is inferior 
for both.   
But it is also possible for the additional benefits of the new technology to be 
asymmetric between the two parties.  Several subcases are possible.  One interesting 
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sibility is when 0<b+π1<b and π2>0.   The equilibrium now becomes (coopera
through what might be interpreted as an institutional refinement keeping the institutio
cooperation intact.  Although the ruler receives a lower payoff under the new technology, 
he is still better off than the alternative of defecting.  Another possibility is when π1>0 
and π2<0.  The equilibrium remains (cooperate, old), even though the ruler could receive 
a higher payoff from the new technology. 
Yet another interesting possibility is when b+π1<0 and π2>0, resulting in a game of 
one-sided Prisoner’s Dilemma with proper
d Prisoner’s Dilemma games.  Although the ruler would really prefer the (cooperate
old) outcome to anything else, he has to choose “defect” defensively, because the legal 
community’s dominant strategy is to choose the new technology.  This would result in an 
equilibrium of (defect, new).  Cooperation cannot be sustained in a single play of this 
game.  The legal community may want to commit to old technology, but they cannot 
credibly do so if the relationship is of limited duration. 
Cooperation is possible, however, when the relationship is repeated.  A well-know
result of game theory is that an infinite number of repeti
ized in this type of situations, where reputation offers a way out of the problem.  The
notion of infinitely repeated interaction clearly applies to the long term relationship 
between the rulers and legal community.  This may explain why despite numerous 
instances of potential conflict that could damage cooperation, the rulers and the legal
community  were for the most part able to maintain a cooperative relationship in Isl
history.  In the long run, cooperation could continue and grow stronger if the endogeno
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process was self-reinforcing.  But it could also get weaker and even discontinue at some 
point if the process was undermining.14  
 
 
IMMEDIATE REACTIONS TO NEW DEVELOPMENTS 






ould be possible.  The most 
obv
e of 
                                                
ork developed here can be used to analyze different types of rea
erved against new ideas, technologies, and legal developments in Islamic history.  T
keep the analysis simple, consider new developments as being exogenous, leaving aside 
the question of where they have come from.  Consider also the immediate reactions to 
these developments first, leaving to the next section the possibility of long term change
following initial reactions.  Immediate reactions could be taken against new 
developments which have been easily recognized, whose impacts have been 
understood, and for which the cost of change was low.  The framework developed
helps to distinguish carefully among these reactions.  Going beyond simple categories of 
“accepted” or “rejected,” we can identify the mechanisms behind each reaction and 
further distinguish between them.  Being accepted did not necessarily mean that the 
and the legal community preferred a new development unanimously; neither did 
immediate rejection mean that both parties were against it. 
When a new development was accepted, several cases c
ious case was when the development was expected to raise the welfare of both the 
ruler and the legal community, and the development was approved as an institutional 
refinement without adverse consequences for cooperation.  Good examples of this typ
 
14 For a theory of endogenous change and examples of reinforcing and undermining processes, see Greif 
(2006).endogeneous proces 
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developments that found easy acceptance can be found in military technology, such as the 
invention of the gunpowder or new types of firearms or cannons, most of which were 
adopted by Islamic societies as quickly as possible.  There was a similar interest in new
developments in navigation and mining industries, novel consumption goods like 
eyeglasses, financial instruments that facilitated banking, and more efficient metho
taxation and tax collection.  Both parties stood to gain from these developments, and the 
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But it is also possible for a new development to be approved even though it was not 
eficial to one of the parties.  This could be the case, for example, if it was expected to
raise the legal community’s return compared to the status quo but reduce that of the ruler. 
The legal community could approve the new development, and the ruler could still 
continue cooperation despite worsening welfare as long as he expected to receive hi
returns from cooperation than confrontation.  Examples of this type of phenomena may 
be found in legal developments that transfer resources from the ruler to the legal 
community.   
Perhaps th
fare loss may be the system of charitable foundations known as the waqf (Kuran, 
2001).  The legal basis for this system was incorporated into the Islamic Law around t
middle of the eighth century, also a period during which the legal community was being 
established and gaining power independently.  The waqf was a successful legal 
instrument, spreading quickly in all successive Islamic societies and receiving im
support from rulers and legal communities.  This is a curious development because the 
 
15 For more specific examples, see, Coşgel (2005), Clarence-Smith (2006); Güçek (1987), Huff (2003), 
İhsanoglu (2004), III); Mallat (1996). 
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rulers stood to lose tax revenues from the endowment of property as waqfs.  Granting ta
exemption to the earnings of property designated as waqf was a significant component of 
the system.  Although the exemption facilitated endowments of property from wealthy 
individuals, it is not clear why the rulers would consent to the resulting reduction in tax 
revenue.  True, the waqf system may have been an efficient mechanism as a whole for th
delivery of public goods and services.  But its benefits to the ruler may have been still 
negative or at least uncertain.  The answer to the puzzle may lie in the benefits of the 
system to the legal community.  Much of the financial support of the community, for 
items ranging from the education and remuneration of its members to the maintenance
the institutions and infrastructure supporting its activities, were provided by the waqfs.  
The legal community could thus prefer the waqf system immediately and enthusiastically
because they benefited greatly from it.  The rulers, on the other hand, indirectly agreed to 
it, despite losing tax revenues, to be able to maintain cooperation with the legal 
community by virtue of being better off under cooperation than confrontation.  T
system was thus adopted as an institutional refinement, keeping intact the cooperation 
between the ruler and the legal community. 






lytically the reasons for why a new 




elopment might be rejected.  An obvious basis for rejecting something was if b
ruler and the legal community perceived it as a threat to their welfare.  Any new 
development that had the potential to raise the powers of the general public or oth
influential groups relative to the ruler and the legal community probably fell under th
category and faced an immediate refusal.  The immediate reaction to scientific 
developments such as new theories of the universe that challenged the views or 
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of the ruler and the legal community, new technologies that made it easier for other 
groups to organize, and threatening legal developments such as those that gave wom
greater rights (in typically patrimonial empires with male-dominated legal communities)
were usually negative.  Labelling such developments as being “western” or “foreign,” the 
rulers and the legal community generally opposed them immediately, not necessarily 
because of religious or cultural concerns but because they threatened their own interes









tion of the legal concept of the corporation.  
Since the corporation could have increased investment, production, and tax revenues, the 
                                                
e opposed to it.  Something could also be rejected because, for example, the legal 
community was against it, even though the ruler could have preferred it over the status
quo.  Perhaps the best example of this type of a development was the printing press.  Th
ruler would have preferred the printing press because the faster and wider dissemination 
of knowledge would be expected to raise production, incomes, and thus the ruler’s tax 
revenue.  But the legal community could lose in the process, because the advancement o
knowledge among the general public could eventually break the legal community’s 
monopoly over knowledge and legal interpretation.  Ibrahim Müteferrika, who secur
the first official permission to establish the printing press in the Ottoman Empire, knew 
this well when he stated that this community, “who possess influence in this country, 
insistently did not give permission for this new invention.”16 The legal community 
considered the printing press threatening to their welfare, and it was banned in the 
Ottoman Empire soon after its invention.  
The same could be said about the rejec
 
16 Güçek (1987: 113).  For the effect of printing press on religious authority in Christianity and Islam, see 








INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE LONG RUN 
 Immediate reaction to a new development need not determine the final outcome.  
True, some initial r f military 
 
t 
                                                
rs could have preferred its recognition as a legal concept.  There were, in fact, ad ho
corporate public bodies selectively recognized by the rulers because of their benefits in 
such things as efficient tax collection.  But it was not in the best interest of the legal 
community to recognize the coporation as a general abstract concept, because doing so 
could have opened the door to the rise of groups with significant power rivalling thei
own.  Their monopoly in the interpretation of legal texts, for example, rested on their 
authority as individuals with legal training, and recognizing the authority of  an 
incorporated office or organization would have threatened their monopoly (Kuran, 200
Granting corporate autonomy to classes of individuals could directly undermine 
status and welfare, and they ruled it out.17  Even if the rulers could have preferred the 
corporation because of its potential for higher welfare and tax revenue, they went alon
with the legal community’s opinion in declining to recognize the concept because they
were better off cooperating with the legal community than breaking the corporation. 
 
eactions became final, as was the case for the adoption o
technologies, until of course an even better technology would become available.  But in 
other cases initial reactions were later reversed, because they could not be sustained in
the long run as institutions continued to evolve and change endogenously.  Sometimes, 
even an immediate reaction that had proved to be self-enforcing in the short run could a
some point be reversed in repeated interaction if there was a process undermining its 
 
17 For a systematic analysis of the reasons for the late adoption of the concept of a corporation, see Kuran 
(2005). 
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continuity in the long run.  It is also important, therefore, to go beyond initial reactions 
and examine economic change in the long run.   
 Sometimes inaction against a new development could become the default negativ









f a new development, the reaction could be reversed later based on other 
institutional developments affecting its cost and benefits to the ruler and the legal 
                                                
recognized appropriately.  Given the incompleteness of their knowledge of new 
developments and the limitations on their capacity to learn and reason, rulers and leg
communities could be following institutionalized rules to choose behavior, and th
prevailing situation could temporarily survive a pressure toward change.  The exogenou
influence, however, could have set off a process undermining the status quo.  In that
change could come gradually as more information became available and the ruler and the 
legal community realized that the prevailing situation was no longer self-reinforcing and 
that an institutional refinement or change was necessary.  The delay in understanding the 
importance of new developments explains why it took a long time for some items, such 
as the mechanical clock, to diffuse in Islamic societies despite the lack of significant 
opposition.  A new development could also be rejected by default, despite being known 
and acceptable, if the cost of change was high.  This could be the case for many of the
technological developments associated with the industrial revolution, such as the steam 
engine, especially those that could not be easily imported or replicated.  Stability in suc
cases could be observed despite parametric change due to high uncertainty and cost of 
change.18   
Even when the immediate reaction was intentional and based on fairly good 
knowledge o
 





y.   
he 




evelopments could have gone unnoticed, eventually creating 
conflicts among different segments of the society and establishing bottlenecks that could 
nity.  If, for example, one of the parties could benefit greatly from a new 
development but it was rejected because the other party expected to lose, this could set
off a process to introduce other institutional refinements to lessen or eliminate the 
negative effect.  At some point, these refinements could make it possible for both
to accommodate the new development without significantly altering the course of histor
Studying long term developments helps to explain the process of adopting t
printing press.  In addition to reduced cost of change as a result of enhancements to the 
technology (for example in its adaptation to the Arabic alphabet), there were refinements 
 of the institutional elements meant to reduce the technology’s negative effect o
the legal community.  The threat to their monopoly was reduced, for example, by their 
ability to allow the spread of knowledge through books but making sure interpretation, 
especially of religious scripture and knowledge, remained in their own hands.  Another 
refinement was their ability to block the printing of religious books while allowing 
secular ones.  Reducing the effect of the printing press on their monopoly and welfare, 
the legal community eventually agreed in 1726 to its establishment in the Ottoman 
Empire.  This was not a complete departure from institutional history at the time. Ga
of interpretation was still closed to ordinary people, the legal community’s monopoly w
unchallenged, and the cooperative relationship between the rulers and the legal 
community was reinforced. 
Sometimes smooth institutional refinements were not sufficient to deal with 
change, and major reforms and a redirection of the path of history could be requ






re difficult to change the organization of the armed forces.  Reorganizing 




ation had not gone far enough, he decided to circumvent the janissaries 
and int  to 
emoved easily without creating other conflicts.  There could also be network 
externalities among new developments, requiring changes to be made all at once and 
making fundamental transformations in other areas a precondition to change.  Moreover, 
the cost of change could be too high due to the vested interests of other influential 
groups, such as the janissaries or provincial notables, with whom new alliances could
made.  These conditions could have at some point forced the ruler and the legal 
community to enter into a confrontational relationship or reset the terms of their 
cooperation. 
A good example of the need for major reforms may be the Ottoman efforts to 
reorganize the military in the nineteenth century.  Whereas the Ottomans were ab
adopt new types of firearms, cannons, and other technological developments quic
was much mo
ting corps was costly because the janissaries and other powerful groups whose
welfare could be affected resisted the changes.  Although the military confrontations of
the eighteenth century against European armies had shown various inadequacies of the 
old organizational structure, attempts to deal with the problem with minor refinements 
did not go far. 
The Ottoman ruler Selim III’s (1789-1807) efforts to impose major changes 
despite the high cost ended up in failure, jeopardizing the traditional relationship betwee
the ruler and the legal community.  Realizing that minor institutional refinements to the
existing organiz
roduce a whole new army called the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedid).  This meant
break his cooperation with the legal community, because significant ranks among this 
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community had been favoring the old organization based on the perception that Selim’s 
reform efforts were also contrary to their own interests.19  In 1807, the head of the legal 
community issued an opinion finding his reforms as being against the law, which 
essentially became the basis for deposing the ruler and executing him and many of his 
supporters.  The traditional cooperation between the Ottoman rulers and the legal 
community had suffered a major setback. 
Mahmud II (1807-39), Selim’s cousin and successor to the throne, rejuvena
cooperation by changing the terms of his relationship with the legal community and 
making key appointments at the top levels of its hierarchy.  To ensure loyal cooper
from those at key positions, he dismissed t
ted the 
ation 






                                                
d them with those willing and able to support him.  He also took various measures 
to reduce the power of the legal community as a whole.  Using their loyalty as suppo
reintroduced a new army and readily slaughtered those janissaries that had assembled to 
march in protest, thus abolishing the janissary organization and breaking a powerful
alliance with the legal community.  He also brought waqf holdings under government 
control, which effectively ended the financial independence of those supported by waqf 
revenues.  A process of secularizing the legal system started, limiting the scope of 
religious law and separating the judicial and religious responsibilities of the legal 
community, thereby relegating the position of the latter to a lower status and reducing t
power of the legal community emanating from it (Berkes, 1964).  These measures reset 
the parameters of the cooperation between the rulers and the legal community, lowe
 
19 Not all members of the legal community supported the janissaries against the ruler.  For divisions within 
the ulema in their opposition to the ruler, see Heyd (1961) and Levy (1971). 
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the cost of change during the consequent Tanzimat reforms (1839-76) and ensuring the 
support of the legal community. 20
CONCLUSION 
Islamic societies have shown different types of reactions against new 
developments in science, technology, and legal systems throughout history.  While the 
immediate reaction to some of these d been negative, others have been 
adopted odified or 
by 
 
lso other developments that were rejected 
immed ven 
                                                
evelopments have 
 as quickly as possible, and some of these initial reactions have been m
even reversed over time.  To provide a comprehensive explanation of these complex 
outcomes, this paper has used insights from recent studies of institutional change.   It 
differs from previous approaches to the problem by offering not an ad hoc explanation 
that considers either stagnation or change as being more typical or justifies a reaction 
identifying a fixed characteristic of Islamic societies or an inherent quality of a new 
development, but by examining each reaction in the context of the strategic interaction 
between rulers and legal communities. 
Some new developments, such as those in military technology, were often 
adopted swiftly because they were expected to make both parties better off or at least no
worse off than before.  But there were a
iately because one of the parties perceived it as threatening to its interests, e
though the other party could have benefitted from it.  The printing press or the legal 
concept of the corporation, for example, were initially rejected, because the legal 
community saw them as contrary to its interests, even though the rulers could have 
 
20 For the relationship between the rulers and the legal community during the Ottoman reforms of the 
nineteenth century, see Chambers (1972), Findley (1980), Heyd (1961), Levy (1971), Zubaida (2003: Ch. 
4), and Zürcher (1997). 
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benefitted from these developments in the form of higher output and tax revenues.  T
rulers went along with these outcomes initially despite the associated loss because
were better off cooperating with the legal community than confronting them directly
Some of the immediate reactions were reversed later through repeated interaction
and long run processes of institutional change.  In some cases, a new development could













l understood.  As more information became available and its cost and benefits 
were better understood, these initial reactions could be modified or reversed, as was the 
case in the delayed adoption of the mechanical clock and some of the technological 
developments associated with the industrial revolution.  Even when the initial reaction
was intentional and based on appropriate knowledge, reversals could follow at some 
point as a result of other institutional developments affecting the expected cost and 
benefits to one or both parties or endogeneous long run processes unleashed by the 
reaction.  This was the case for the the printing press, eventually adopted as its cost an
benefits were better understood and various other developments made it more consis
with the interests of the legal community.  While many of these reversals could be in
form of minor institutional refinements consistent with the basic cooperation between the
rulers and legal communities, occasionally they had to restructure their cooperation and 
reset the parameters of their relationship to be able to deal with change, as was the case 
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